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AGRICULTURE AND CITIZEN COMPLAINTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  Increasing levels of regulation have been imposed on the agricultural sector in response 
to concerns that farming can have detrimental impacts on environmental quality.  Many of the 
policy instruments have been targeted to livestock operators, who have grown significantly in 
size and intensity over the years.  The severity of the regulations varies geographically as 
documented by Metcalf and Beghin (2000) but a typical regional by-law involves the submission 
of a nutrient management plan (NMP) before a building permit is issued for the construction of a 
new barn.  Random inspections after the facility is built are used to ensure the NMP is being 
followed. 
  Several unanswered questions face policy makers designing cost-effective 
environmental regulations for the farm sector.  For example, it is assumed that increasing 
regulations will reduce the number of spills and environmental degradation.  However, it is not 
clear whether restrictions on management practices, aside from complete prohibition of 
production, can limit dissatisfaction with farmers from local residents.  Similarly, little is known 
about the relationship between complaints and spills.  Since third party random inspections are 
an increasingly common form of ensuring compliance, reports of violations by local citizens can 
serve as a cost-effective means of targeting potential polluters.  On the other hand, the 
complaints may be coming disproportionately from regions with higher than average education 
and income levels.  Residents of such areas are more likely to have the desire to improve 
environmental health and have both the expertise and means to lodge effective local action 
through complaints.  Another potential problem using complaints within the regulation process is 
that the complaints may not be directly related to violations.  Within the livestock sector, 
complaints are often related to nuisance issues such as odour rather than directly correlated to 
environmental problems such as excessive nutrient levels in groundwater.  Thus, complaints   2 
may not be an accurate measurement of regulation non-compliance and thereby an ineffective 
information tool for enforcement.  
  Previous research into the relationship between spills, regulations, and citizen 
complaints is limited.  Russell, Harrington and Vaughan (1986) note the regional variability in 
complaints to the US EPA and suggest that the variation is due to factors other than 
environmental quality but no analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis.  These authors 
found few of the complaints, which were all investigated, resulted in convictions for polluters 
suggesting that complaints may not be a cost effective means of monitoring.  The relationship 
between citizen complaints and pollution levels was examined for China by Dasgupta and 
Wheeler (1996) and for Indonesia by Pargal and Wheeler (1996).  Higher education levels 
increased the probability of filing complaints bringing into question the accuracy of citizen 
complaints.  Authors () found within a developed country context that increases in wealth and 
income were positively related to complaint rates and that these rates were weakly related to 
actual pollution spills, except in the case of discharges to the air.  None of these studies have 
examined whether complaints against agricultural producers are an accurate signal of pollution 
or a measure of local preferences.  Nor have they examined the influence of environmental 
regulations on the level of spills and the rate of citizen complaints. 
  The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics of citizen complaints about 
local agricultural practices.  The paper addresses the regional characteristics where spills occur, 
if these spills are generating complaints, and what types of citizens are doing the complaining.  
It also determines whether local regulations affect emissions and complaints.  The paper begins 
by developing a theoretical model of the decision to lodge a complaint by a representative 
citizen.  The next section describes the unique data set available to test the hypotheses.  The 
set includes the number and type of complaints lodged against agricultural producers, socio-
economic characteristics of the local citizens, characteristics of the regional agricultural sector 
including the severity of local environmental regulations, and the number and type of self-  3 
reported pollution discharges by farmers for 167 municipalities in the province of Ontario over a 
4 year period.  The fourth section describes the major results and the final section concludes 
with implications of the findings. 
 
2. THEORETICAL  MODEL 
  To address the several questions surrounding the relationships between environmental 
regulations, pollution discharges and complaints, we begin by modeling the effects of 
regulations (Rj) on the number of agricultural spills of type a in region j (Saj).  We will assume 
that 
Saj = S (Rj, Ljk)       (1) 
where Ljk is the number of livestock farms in region j of type k.  We hypothesize that increasing 
the stringency of regulations decreases the likelihood of spills (∂ S/∂ R < 0) while increasing the 
density of livestock farms has the opposite effect (∂ S/∂ L > 0).  The latter marginal effect will 
vary between spill and farm types.  For example, spills into waterways are more likely to occur 
from swine farms with large volumes of liquid manure than from poultry farms with relatively 
smaller amounts of dry manure. 
  Spills have a negative effect on environmental quality within a given region (Q).  
Regulations affect Q indirectly by reducing the number of agricultural spills (equation 1) but also 
act as a proxy for efforts such as stream rehabilitation that serve to improve environmental 
health in general.  The level of Q also depends on physical characteristics of the region (Z).  For 
example, Q will be higher in wilderness areas than densely populated urban areas.  Finally, it is 
assumed that environmental quality improves with the per capita rate of complaining regarding 
affected resource m in region j (Cjm).  Total number of complaints in a region is the average 
number of complaints registered by an individual (c) multiplied by total population for the region 
(POP).  Thus,  
   Qj = Qj (Saj, Rj, Cjm, Z)       ( 2 )    4 
  Whether an individual in a given region lodges a complaint of type m (cjm) depends on 
whether the expected benefits of doing so in terms of improved environmental health outweigh 
the costs of lodging the complaint.  This decision to complain is assumed to be the result of a 
utility maximization problem in which the individual in region j derives satisfaction (U) from the 
level of purchased goods consumed (X), and the level of environmental quality for the region 
(Qj) according to 
   Uij = Ui (Xi, Qj ; Hi, Zj)      (3) 
where Hi is a set of socio-economic characteristics of the individual and Zj is a set of regional 
characteristics.  
Environmental quality is influenced by the set of variables summarized in equation (2).  
The other constraint to the utility maximization problem is with the allocation of effort and 
consequently purchasing power given by 
   PxXi + Pc(Hi)⋅ cijm = Pw(Hi) Wi + rA    (4) 
Where Px is the price of purchased goods X, Pc is the cost of lodging an individual complaint c, 
Pw is the wage rate per unit of time, W is the number of hours worked, and r is the rate of return 
on an asset base of A.  Socio-economic characteristics (H) such as education and age influence 
both the wage rate and the cost of filing a complaint.  Total income derived from employment 
(PwW) and investments (rA) less the amount spent on complaining (Pcc) can be spent on 
consumption goods. 
  Upon substitution of equations (1), (2) and (4) into (3), results in the following utility 
function which is maximized through the number and type of complaints regarding 
environmental impacts of farm practices 
  Max U [Pw’(H)W + rA’ - Pc’(H)cjm, Qj(Saj(Rj, Ljk), Rj, cjmPOPj , Zj ; Hi, Zj)]   (5) 
  cjm 
 
where the prime notation denotes monetary variables deflated by the price of consumption 
goods (e.g. Pw’ = Pw/Px).     5 
The optimal number of individual complaints is found through solution to the following 
Kuhn-Tucker condition, 
   cjm [ -Ux Pc′  + UQ⋅ Qc⋅ POP] = 0 
where Ux and UQ are the marginal utilities for consumption and environmental quality 
respectively.  At the optimum, the marginal costs of complaining in terms of the value of the 
reduction in the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the marginal benefits in terms of the 
incremental improvement in satisfaction derived from a better natural environment.  The 
individual will not register a complaint if the marginal cost (Ux Pc′ ) is greater than the marginal 
benefit (UQ⋅ Qc⋅ POP) of doing so. 
  The decision to complain and the effect of exogenous variables such as environmental 
stringency are illustrated in Figure 1.  Line AB represents a budget constraint with point A 
indicating that the representative citizen by spending all available income (Pw’W + rA′ ) on 
consumer goods could purchase X
A and still enjoy Q
A units of environmental quality.  At point B, 
filing c
B complaints improves environmental conditions to Q
B but the process reduces 
disposable income (Pw’W + rA′ - Pc’c
B) so that purchased goods are reduced to X
B.  The trade-off 
between X and Q is illustrated through indifference curves such as U
E where provides U1
E more 
satisfaction to the individual than the choice set given by U0
E.  For a consumer with a budget 
constraint of AB and preferences represented by the indifference curves U
E, consumption is 
maximized at E (Q
E, X
E) with c
E complaints.  If the consumer placed less value on the 
environment, the indifference curves would become flatter and would become horizontal if the 
consumer only derived satisfaction from the consumption of purchased goods.  A relatively flat 
indifference curve such as U
A would result in X
A units of goods consumed and no complaints 
registered against potential polluters. 
  A consumer who is in a cleaner environment but with the same income level faces the 
budget constraint A’B’.  Filing no complaints allows all income to be spent on buying X
A   6 
consumer goods but environmental quality in the region is Q
B rather than Q
A.  The consumer 
with preferences represented by U
E reported c
E complaints in the poor quality environment but 




  If the consumer faces a higher per unit price to lodge a complaint (P’c) or the marginal 
effectiveness of a complaint on improving environmental quality decreases relative to the 
original scenario, the resource constraint shifts from AB to AD.  With the same set of 
preferences as the original scenario (U
E), the optimal consumption levels are given by point F.  
In contrast to equilibrium E, consumption falls to X
B and environmental quality falls to Q
F.  The 
effect on the optimal number of complaints (c
E vs c








  Higher income levels cause the resource constraint to shift upward.  For example, an 
individual facing an environmental condition of Q
A would be able to purchase X
A’’ consumer 
goods rather than X
A with a corresponding increase in income.  Higher purchasing power results 
in a move in the budget constraint to A’’B” and results in an optimal solution of Q
B, X
B” for an 
individual with preferences represented by U
E.  Thus, the higher income level results in a 
greater number of complaints. 
 
3. DATA 
Data on spills, regulations, complaints and regional characteristics were gathered at the 
municipal level for 12 counties in southwestern Ontario over the period 1993 to 1996.  The 
counties selected are the location for most of the livestock farms in the province and, 
correspondingly, most of the complaints surrounding farming practices.   
Spill data by agricultural producers was obtained from the Ontario Ministry of the 
Environment (MOE).  The discharges represent violations that have been self-reported by the 
polluter.  The spills are categorized by the medium of the discharge (land, water, air, or   7 
combination thereof) and by the effects (water contamination, soil contamination, or harmful to 
human and/or animal health).  There were 126 reported spills by farmers over the four year 
period with a high of 38 in 1993 and a low of 22 spills in 1995.   The majority of the 126 spills 
were onto land directly (49%) with 24% into water sources, 21% into a multi-medium, and 6% 
into air.  Ninety of the 167 townships reported no spills from agriculture and 47 had only one 
reported spill. 
  The MOE was also the source for complaint data.  There were 1014 phoned-in 
complaints against agriculture over the four-year period and this represent approximately 5% of 
the total complaints made to the MOE.  The numbers of complaints were evenly distributed 
across the four years with a high of 286 made in 1996 and a low of 229 in 1995.  All but 27 of 
the 167 townships reported a complaint against agriculture over the four years with most 
reporting multiple complaints.  The complaints were categorized by type (odour, dust, pesticide, 
noise, litter etc.) and approximately half of the total in a given year were associated with odour. 
Regulations are assumed to reduce the likelihood of spills and complaints.  Regulations 
facing the livestock sector are proxied by several variables that are summarized in Table 1.  
Marchand and McEwan (1997) calculated a restricitiveness rating for each township based on 
the percentage of a 100 acre farm on which a hog farm could be built (Restrict).  The number of 
manure storage days (Storage) required by new livestock facilities also represents a measure of 
regulation stringency.  A larger storage allows the producer to apply waste less frequently and 
thereby reduce the likelihood of complaints.  It will also reduce the probability of spills as the 
manure can be applied at times when the crop can take up the nutrients and thus reduce the 
chance of runoff.  Most municipalities require that the barn have a minimum frontage and be 
located a minimum distance from neighbours and/or the roadway (MSD).  The area required for 
building rather than production will increase with the required separation distances.  Thus, the 
smaller the percentage of total land available for construction based on the minimum separation 
distance (MSD), the more restrictive the township MSD.  The minimum distance from the   8 
waterway and minimum lot size for new barns (Lot Size) are also assumed to be negatively 
related to spills and complaints as the likelihood for contact with water resources and 
neighbours is reduced. 
Regional characteristics are divided into three categories.  The first measures the 
significance of the livestock sector within the municipality (L).  The numbers of hogs (Hog) and 
dairy (Dairy) produced within each municipality and the growth rates in that production (Hog 
Growth and Dairy Growth) are assumed to be positively related to spills and complaints.  
Livestock intensity is assumed to increase the likelihood of spills and thus, complaints.   
The second category of regional characteristics is physical (Z).  The ruralness of a 
region is proxied by the percentage of the township zoned agriculture (Rural).  Spills are likely to 
be greater but complaints less in areas with a larger share of land devoted to farming.  
Complaints are assumed to be greater in those areas located next to a Great Lake.  Cottage 
owners along the shoreline are more likely to oppose farm practices that will negatively affect 
their outdoor experience.   
The third regional category is socio-economic (H).  While spills are assumed to be 
unaffected by such factors, these variables will influence the relative net benefits of complaints.  
Population density (Popn) and growth (Popn Growth) are assumed to have a direct correlation 
with the likelihood of complaints.  More people imply a greater chance for conflict between 
farmers and their neighbours surrounding appropriate practices.  The greater the percentage of 
the labour force employed by agriculture (Farm Work) and unemployed (UE) the lower the 
probability of complaints.  Economic pressures resulting from complaints against farmers will 
negatively affect those employed within the agricultural sector and also reduce the likelihood of 
employment for those seeking jobs.  Education is measured as the percentage of the population 
with a university degree.  Higher levels of education decrease the cost of lodging a complaint 
and increase the incentive for doing so since the individual may be more aware of the 
environmental impacts.  Thus, education increases the likelihood of complaints.  Wealth is   9 
measured in terms of average value of dwellings (Assets) and average employment income 
(Income).  While increases in wealth increase the opportunity cost of complaining, the marginal 
satisfaction of improving environmental quality through citizen action is greater.  The later effect 
is assumed to dominate the former so that increases and wealth are assumed to increase the 
likelihood and number of complaints.  The summary statistics for these explanatory variables 




The theoretical model hypothesized that spills in a municipality were inversely related to 
environmental regulations while livestock production would have the opposite effect.  The 
comparison of the means for these variables between regions experiencing spills and those did 
not is consistent with the assumptions (see Table 1).  The regions with no spills from agriculture 
required on average larger manure storages, further distances from waterway, and larger lot 
size.  Similar results were obtained under the logit regression model but only the effect of the 
manure storage was statistically significant (see Table 2).  Having more storage capacity 
provides greater opportunity to spread livestock waste at times of the year with greatest chance 
for nutrient uptake and therefore less chance of runoff. 
Agricultural characteristics had little effect on the likelihood of a self-reported spill from 
farming.  A comparison of the means in Table 1 suggests that more intensive livestock regions 
have fewer spills on average.  The logit regression coefficients have the expected signs but the 
effects are not statistically significant.  The only agricultural variable that is significant is the 
percentage of the region that is zoned for agriculture.  Thus, spills are more likely to occur in 
rural areas, as expected, but not necessarily those that are livestock intensive. 
 
4.2. Complaints   10 
There is a positive, albeit weak, relationship between the occurrence of spills and the 
lodging of complaints within a municipality.  The average number of spills in a region with no 
complaints is 4.5 while it is 7.8 in regions with complaints (see Table 1).  The former is 
influenced by one municipality for which there were no self-reported spills but which had 85 
complaints registered over time.  The variation in the relationship between spills and complaints 
is illustrated in the scatter plot of Figure 2.  An OLS regression of the data suggests that 2 
complaints are generated for every spill on average but the R-squared is only 0.05.  Differences 
in the severity of the spills may result in differing numbers of complaints and result in the noisy 
relationship suggested by Figure 2. 
The factors affecting the likelihood of complaints were determined through a logit 
regression model and the results are listed in Table 2.  As implied by Figure 2 and Table 1, the 
occurrence of a spill has a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of a complaint 
being filed in a region.  The stringency of environmental regulations has a mixed effect on the 
likelihood of complaining depending on the by-law.  However, the only statistically significant 
variable is the minimum distance separation requirement between the livestock facility and a 
waterway (MSD).  As expected, an increase in MSD decreases the likelihood of an obvious 
detrimental effect of livestock production on water and thus the likelihood of complaining.   
Regional characteristics appear to have little effect on the probability of complaints.  
Surprisingly, the growth rate in hog production has a negative effect.  Most of the media 
coverage and citizen concern appears to be directed toward large-scale hog operations.  While 
these concerns may affect the location of farming operations, it does not appear to have an 
effect on the number of complaints.  In fact, most of the growth in hogs has occurred within the 
traditional hog production municipalities of Huron and Perth counties, and relatively few 
complaints were registered in those regions.  A factor that does significantly affect the likelihood 
of complaints is the percentage of the region that is zoned for agriculture.  Given the statistically 
insignificant effects of population density and growth, the result suggests that complaints are   11 
more likely associated in regions with scattered development that invites more potential conflict 
between farmers and their non-farm neighbours.  The final statistically significant variable is the 
average value of the dwelling within a region.  Increases in wealth have a positive effect on the 
probability of complaining as expected since the relative costs of a decrease in property value of 
degradation in the local environment will be greater for higher value regions. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper has addressed the relationship between agricultural spills and environmental 
complaints filed by citizens against agriculture.  It has also determined the influence of other 
factors on the likelihood of both farm spills and complaints within a region.  The relationships 
have been estimated using a unique data set containing the number of spills and complaints 
along with regional data such as the stringency of environmental regulations and socio-
economic variables. 
Different environmental regulations do appear to have an effect on the spills and 
complaints.  By-laws on the size of manure storage facility in relation to the number of livestock 
housed influence the likelihood of spills within a region.  Larger storages decrease the number 
of annual manure applications and thus the opportunity for runoff.  While the required distance 
between a new barn and a waterway appears to have no effect on the likelihood of spills, it does 
decrease the probability of complaints being lodged against agriculture.  Increases in the 
percentage of the regions zoned as agriculture also decreases the likelihood of complaining.  
Together the results suggest that distance between livestock producers and both 
environmentally sensitive areas and people are an effective means to reduce conflicts between 
farmers and the local community. 
Another policy question raised in the study was the effectiveness of using citizen 
complaints as an information tool in addressing environmental quality issues surrounding 
agriculture.  There is a positive, albeit weak, positive influence between spills in a region and the   12 
number of complaints.  Complaints could be used to indicate problem areas but the information 
signal will be noisy.  Regulators will have to be aware that such complaints are more likely to 
come from wealthy areas when deciding upon how to react to complaints.  The weak results on 
the factors affecting complaints suggest that other variables need to be included within the 
model such as the type of spills.  In addition, future research will use a two stage procedure to 
first determine the likelihood of complaints and then the number of complaints given that one 
has been filed.   13 
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Table 1.  Means (and Standard Deviations) for Variables, by Region Categorized by 
Number of Agricultural Spills and Complaints 
   Regions  with Regions  with 
Variable Definition  No  Spills  > 1 Spill  No Complaints  > 1 Complaint 
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Number 177  townships  90  67  27 140 
   15 
Table 2.  Logit Regression Results for Factors Explaining the Likelihood of Agricultural 
Spills and Complaints against Agriculture within a Municipality 
Explanatory    
Variable Spills  Complaints 

























































   Popn    -0.003 
(-1.187) 
   Popn Growth    -0.021 
(-0.308) 
   Farm Work    0.033 
(0.553) 
   UE    0.024 
(0.135) 




   Wealth 
      Assets 
  0.0002 
(1.663) 








Log-Likelihood -67.08  -32.57 
*z-values in parenthesis  
Coefficients significant at the 90% confidence level are in bold. 
 































   
 
 










































































Figure 2.  Relationship between Number of Agricultural Spills and Complaints by 
Municipality 